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This paper examines the larger economic forces that shape multilateral trade agreements and
concludes that further WTO trade reform in the grain and oilseed sectors will be difficult to
achieve. The somewhat successful Uruguay Round had budget and internal reform pressure
to assist the process. The United States currently has large budget surpluses, and efficiency
effects from policy reform following the Uruguay Round have reduced the possible gains
from further domestic reform. Without these pressures, further negotiated reform in the grain
and oilseed sectors is a remote possibility. On the other hand, there are good prospects for a
multilateral environmental agreement on climate change. Ratification of a climate change
agreement could have a large impact on the grain and oilseed sectors as such an agreement
would divert excess resources from food production.1
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I n t r o d u c t i o n
C
urrently there is a great deal of uncertainty regarding the timing and nature of future
agricultural trade reforms. The Uruguay Round of GATT ended in 1993 with signifi-
cant success in reform of agricultural trading rules and an agreement to examine further
agricultural reforms in 1999. With last year’s debacle in Seattle, and more importantly the
booming U.S. economy, it is unclear how and when further progress will be made.
Vol um e  2   N um be r  1 , 2 00 1/   p. 6 0 - 7 4 e s t ey j o u r n a l . c o mThe purpose of this paper is to explore the prospects for significant WTO agricultural
trade reforms in the grain and oilseed sectors. The paper presents a long-term perspective
that examines the larger political economic forces that could motivate significant reform
and does not address many of the smaller issues that are part of the current negotiation
process.
Two hypotheses are examined in this paper:
• Further significant agricultural trade reform in the WTO is unlikely for at least the
next decade.
• The ratification of a climate change accord would have a significant impact on agri-
cultural trade and agricultural trade agreements.
The following section of this paper develops the first hypothesis, beginning with a brief
historical review that highlights the conditions that existed prior to the somewhat success-
ful Uruguay Round (UR) and the difficulty in making progress in agriculture. Some of the
unique conditions that existed during the UR are outlined. The effect the WTO agreement
has had on domestic and trade policy design in grains and oilseeds is examined. This is fol-
lowed by a description of recent market conditions and the effect these conditions have had
on the belief that free trade will benefit primary producers. The conclusion of the second
section of the paper summarizes the current apathy toward further grain and oilseed trade
reform.
The second hypothesis, which deals with the potential importance of a climate change
agreement, is developed in the third section of the paper. This section begins with a brief
outline of the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) and a discussion of the
status of the Kyoto Accord. This is followed by a description of greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions from agriculture and the potential role agriculture can play in short-term GHG
reduction. This section then examines the U.S. perspective on how agriculture’s role in
GHG reduction enhances the prospects for ratification of the Kyoto Accord. The third sec-
tion concludes with a discussion of the pervasive effects a climate change agreement could
have on world agricultural production and trade. Closing remarks and conclusions are out-
lined in a fourth and final section. 
Further Agricultural Trade Reform in the WTO is Unlikely
Past Failures to Include Agriculture in the GAT T
Between 1947 and 1993 significant agricultural trade reform was not a part of the GATT.
In fact, the only GATT agreement that included significant reforms for agriculture was the
UR. Thus, agricultural reform is not an inherent part of the GATT/WTO process—it is the
exception rather than the rule. According to Rausser:
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cle to successful negotiations has been agriculture (1995, p.8).
At least three identifiable factors contributed to the exclusion of agriculture from the
GATTfor the first 45 years:2 (1) the negotiations were influenced by issues of food securi-
ty and grain prices that existed prior to and during each GATT round; (2) in Europe, food
security issues, and later the Common Agricultural Policy, made agricultural trade reform
undesirable; and (3) in the United States, there was a strong desire to stabilize and manage
markets, which the U.S. government successfully did. Given that these forces could still
play a role today they warrant some review.
Grain Prices and Food Security
In the year 2000, after many years of abundant food supplies and low real grain prices, it is
easy to forget that concern about food security was a major obstacle for the inclusion of
agriculture in the GATT. Clearly, in the early post-GATT years, food security was an impor-
tant issue for European countries. The Netherlands had suffered from famine during World
War II. After the War, Europe as a whole was a significant importer of grain. As a result,
the industrial countries of Europe wanted to become less reliant on agricultural imports. In
the United States and Canada agriculture had come out of the very difficult depression years
and was prospering with high prices at the time of the first GATT round. Given these con-
ditions it is not hard to understand why agriculture was exempted from the 1947 GATT
agreement. The issue of global food security gained profile again in the early 1970s, during
the Tokyo Round of the GATT, when large grain purchases by the USSR caused a decrease
in grain stocks and high grain prices throughout the world. Figure 1 shows the inflation-
adjusted Saskatchewan farm price for wheat from 1926 to present, and the timing of the
GATT rounds. The figure shows that all rounds that failed to bring about agricultural
reform took place with higher than average wheat prices and that the initial 1947 Round and
the Tokyo Round took place during periods of very high grain prices. These high prices not
only reduced the perceived need for reform; they raised the profile of the food security
issue.
While the high grain prices of the late 1940s and the early 1970s raised concerns about
global food security, for many developing countries and developed Asian countries food
security has continued to be an important issue since the inception of the GATT and con-
tinues to be an issue today. This persistent concern about food security, and the international
will to address the issue, can be observed in the creation and funding of various interna-
tional research institutes to address the world food problem. This process began with the
establishment of the International Rice Research Institute in 1960 and the International
Wheat and Maize Improvement Center (CIMMYT) in 1966 to develop higher yielding
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the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). The CGIAR was
established in 1971 with the stated objective of contributing to food security and poverty
eradication in developing countries. The cosponsors of the CGIAR are the World Bank, the
United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), and the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP). The international will to support the CGIAR suggests
that food security was, and continues to be, an important issue for many countries. Food
security in less developed countries will continue to be an important issue. As these coun-
tries gain importance within the WTO, concern about food security may continue to be an
obstacle to further agricultural trade reform. 
European Community Solidarity
The European Community (EC) with its original six members was established in 1957. The
development of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was a central pillar of the
European Community. Member countries viewed the EC as a way to keep Europe unified,
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Figure 1 Deflated Saskatchewan wheat prices 1926–99 ($1999/bu.)
Source:  Saskatchewan Agriculture and Food Statistics Handbook 1999which was an important goal given its history of armed conflict. The protection of the CAP
made EC member countries strongly opposed to agricultural trade reform within the GATT.
The EC strongly resisted agricultural trade reform in the Dillon Round (1960–62), in the
Kennedy Round (1963–67), and in the Tokyo Round (1973–79) (Rausser, 1995). Although
the prospect of European Union (EU) expansion has created pressure for some reform, the
CAP continues to be a central pillar of the EU.
United States Support for A g r i c u l t u r e
The United States has been one of the central players in each GATT round. At least part of
the reason for unsuccessful agricultural trade reform lies within the U.S. borders. From
1940 to 1980 U.S. farm policy was heavily influenced by the years of the Great Depression,
when low commodity prices impoverished many farm families. After the high prices of the
1940s, the government of the United States introduced farm legislation to protect produc-
ers from the vagaries of over supply and low prices. From the mid-1950s until the 1985
Farm Bill, the government successfully supported wheat and corn prices with commodity
storage programs and area set-asides. From 1957 until 1984 the world wheat price remained
very close to the U.S. loan rate, with the exception of some upward deviation in seven of
the years when wheat stocks reached low levels. The U.S. Congress found it politically
important to retain the right to protect their producers from low prices and was opposed to
having its hands tied by foreign policy. Section 22 of the U.S. Agricultural Adjustment Act
of 1933 explicitly allowed for the use of import quotas to protect the operation of domestic
farm programs. In 1951, Congress passed an amendment to Section 22 by adding subsec-
tion (f):
No trade agreement or other international agreement heretofore or hereafter
entered into by the United States shall be applied in a manner inconsistent with
the requirements of this section (Rausser, 1995, p.7).
This amendment to Section 22 tied the hands of U.S. trade negotiators, preventing them
from bargaining away U.S. domestic protection; it was not repealed until 1995 with the cre-
ation of the WTO.
Success in the Uruguay Round
Limited agricultural trade reform was achieved in the UR after nearly a decade of negotia-
tions. During the negotiations agriculture again became the most significant barrier to a new
agreement. Rausser (1995) outlines the major forces that came together to make an agree-
ment possible. The Reagan Administration had unsuccessfully tried to reform internal U.S.
agricultural policies in 1981 and again in 1985. Both times, Congress soundly rejected these
proposals. In the process that followed the 1985 Farm Bill it became clear that, while U.S.
unilateral policy reform was not possible, multilateral trade reform was perhaps desirable.
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1990s that agreement between the EU and the United States began to look feasible. At that
time both parties were facing severe budget crises and growing grain stocks. Both had
developed internal reform packages to reduce export subsidy expenditures. The Dunkel
plan took these internal packages and used them as the foundation of the UR Agreement
on Agriculture (AoA). Finally, to the relief of all parties involved in the marathon round,
an agreement was reached in December 1993 and the WTO and the AoA came into effect
in 1995 (Sumner, 1995).
The Impact of the WTO on Domestic Program Efficiency
The AoA has increased the efficiency of domestic agricultural support, and this improved
efficiency will influence direction of further agricultural trade reform. The Uruguay
Round agreements resulted in the creation of the WTO, with new rules disciplining both
domestic agricultural policy and agricultural trade policy. The new disciplines have coin-
cided with significant changes in domestic policies that reduce the economic distortions
associated with support of the grain and oilseed sectors throughout the developed world.
In Canada, this has meant the elimination of both the Guaranteed Revenue Insurance
Program and the subsidy through the Western Grain Transportation Act.
In the United States, the “freedom to farm” legislation provisions within the Federal
Agricultural Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act of 1996 resulted in “decoupled” pay-
ments to farmers, which enhance farmer income but have a limited impact on production
decisions. The Conservation Reserve Program reduces the output from the grain and
oilseed sectors. Table 1 reports Gardner’s (2000) estimates of gains and losses from grain
and oilseed commodity programs in 1987 versus 1999/2000. According to his figures, the
transfer efficiency increased from 81 percent in 1987 to 99 percent in 1999/2000. The
FAIR Act came into effect during the interval. (Transfer efficiency is a measure of the
amount of benefit provided to the target group for every dollar of cost to others in the
economy. In this case, transfer efficiency is a measure of the amount of benefit provided
to producers for every dollar of cost to consumers and taxpayers in the economy.)
In the EU, set-aside requirements and reductions in the level of support have reduced
the economic distortions. These changes to the form of support have reduced the dead-
weight loss associated with farm programs. 
The fiscal situations of OECD countries have improved dramatically in the past five
years and tax rates have fallen in most countries. This has not only reduced budgetary
pressure; it has reduced the amount of economic distortion caused by taxation, making
income transfers easier to carry out than they were during the UR, and decreasing the asso-
ciated efficiency looses. The economic efficiency reasons given in the past for reform are
less important today than they were during the UR.
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increase in the efficiency of a farm program will result in a choice of greater income trans-
fer by policy makers. Figure 2 illustrates this using numbers from table 1. During the UR,
when U.S. farm policy was imposing large costs on the U.S. economy, policy makers
sought reform through international negotiations. The current programs give policy mak-
ers the ability to support agriculture with fewer economic losses. This suggests that U.S.
policy makers no longer need trade agreements to reduce domestic losses, and furthermore,
they now may be less eager, and perhaps reluctant, to negotiate any of this new-found abil-
ity away in future trade agreements. This policy environment reduces one of the econom-
ic forces that played a role in the success of the AoA under the Uruguay Round.
Price Effects of Trade Liberalization
At the time of the UR there was a great deal of rhetoric surrounding the beneficial effects
of agricultural liberalization. In particular, the reductions in trade distortions were to ben-
efit farmers through higher and more stable prices. For instance, in Canada, the minister of
agriculture chastised an economist over the results of his study that indicated that farmers
would be worse off in a freer trade environment. This promarket rhetoric, which was very
much a product of the Reagan, Thatcher and Mulroney era, helped sell the UR negotiations
to the agricultural sector.
This type of argument would not sell as well today. After a brief period of higher grain
prices in 1996/97, grain prices have declined and are at, or are approaching, all-time lows
despite significant trade liberalization. These low prices cannot easily be attributed to large
distortions; rather, they are more commonly viewed as an inevitable part of a functioning,
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Table 1 Gains and Losses from U.S. Commodity Programs: 1987 and 1999/2000 
Producer gains Buyer & Deadweight Transfer
taxpayer  loss efficiency
gains
1987 Billion dollars
Grains and oilseeds 11.8 -14.6 -2.8 81%
Total commodities 17.5 -22.5 -5.0 78%
1999/2000: Billion dollars
Grains and oilseeds 15.5 -15.6 -0.1 99%
Total commodities 19.1 -20.2 -1.1 95%
Source: Gardner, 2000competitive commodity market. Rather than look at free trade as a solution to the income
crisis, many farmers in Canada are beginning to look at decoupled forms of income sup-
port. More importantly, U.S. farmers do not see their potential economic salvation in a free
market. The lack of significant perceived price impacts from further grain and oilseed pol-
icy liberalization reduces the pressure for further agricultural trade reform.
S u m m a r y
This section has outlined several factors that support the hypothesis that further significant
agricultural trade reform in the WTO is unlikely for at least the next decade. Agricultural
trade reform has always been difficult to incorporate in the multilateral process. The dis-
tinctive budgetary conditions that existed in both the EU and the United States during the
UR no longer exist. The reforms made as result of the AoA have increased the efficiency
of domestic support programs. Growing budget surpluses have also reduced the efficiency
losses associated with taxation. Finally, very low commodity prices, despite a more liber-
al trading environment, make further liberalization a very tough sell to the grain and
oilseed sectors. Given this combination of factors, the pressure for further agricultural trade
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Figure 2 Grain and oilseed support and the transfer efficiency frontier
Source:  data from table 1; adapted from Gardner’s framework (1987)reform is much more limited than it was during the UR. With reduced pressure for further
agricultural trade reform the rent-seeking and protectionist forces are much more likely to
prevail. Prospects for further multilateral trade liberalization in the grain and oilseed sec-
tors are poor.
The Potential Impact of the Kyoto A c c o r d
This section examines the hypothesis that the ratification of a climate change accord would
have a significant impact on agricultural trade. 
In 1992, in Rio de Janeiro, many countries agreed to stabilize greenhouse gas emis-
sions, creating the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
Despite the agreement, emissions continued to grow. In 1997, the parties to the UNFCCC
met again in Kyoto and made further commitments to limit and reduce GHG emissions. In
the Kyoto agreement, the developed countries of the world agreed to specific emission tar-
gets to be achieved during the 2008–2012 period, relative to a 1990 baseline. In this accord,
Canada committed to a reduction in GHG emissions to a level 6 percent lower than 1990
emissions, the United States agreed to a 7 percent reduction, and the EU agreed to an 8 per-
cent reduction (UNFCCC, 1997). These reduction targets are much more significant than
the absolute percentages would suggest given the growth in post-1990 emissions. In
Canada, the 6 percent Kyoto reduction target represents a 25 percent reduction below busi-
ness-as-usual projections.
At present, the Kyoto Accord is very much an incomplete agreement. The developing
countries of the world, including the very populous countries of India and China, are not
signatories to the accord. Many features are vaguely described, for example, “joint imple-
mentation” and “clean development mechanisms”. These are emission-trading mecha-
nisms that have yet to be defined. Many definitions and measurements have yet to be
agreed upon, for example, the definition of a managed versus an unmanaged forest. While
the decomposition of organic matter in agricultural soils has been defined as a source of
carbon dioxide (CO2) in the accord, soil is not included as a sink. (A sink is a process
whereby atmospheric CO2 is sequestered by plants, converted into organic matter, and
stored in the soil.) Similarly, the uses of agricultural and forest crops in building products
are not yet included as sinks. Importantly for trade, there are no agreed upon penalties for
non-compliance within the accord. 
Despite the current incompleteness of the accord, the greatest limitation at this time is
that it has to be ratified in order to become a binding agreement. The accord does not
“come into effect” until countries responsible for 55 percent of the GHG emissions have
ratified the agreement (UNFCCC, 1997). In other words, if Canada were to ratify the
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would not be binding until enough other countries did likewise, bringing the accord into
effect. This ratification process has introduced a great deal of uncertainty for the signato-
ries because there is a good chance the accord will not have sufficient ratification to come
into effect.
At this time, the United States Congress has not granted presidential fast-track
approval to negotiate a climate change agreement. By not granting this approval, Congress
retains the ability to vote on and accept particular parts of the accord while rejecting other
parts. As previous experience with trade agreements has shown, other countries will be
very reluctant to ratify the accord under such conditions. Furthermore, given that the
United States is responsible for 35 percent of total GHG emissions, U.S. ratification is piv-
otal to the overall agreement. The ratification climate could change further following the
outcome of the 2000 U.S. congressional and presidential elections. In general, the
Democrats are in favor of GHG reduction while the Republicans are opposed.
Agricultural GHG Emissions
The agricultural sector is a significant global GHG emitter. Each country has different lev-
els of emissions depending on the agricultural systems employed. The agricultural emis-
sions from Canada are provided below to give some idea of the magnitude and the sources
of GHG emissions in agriculture.
The estimates of 1991 GHG emissions for Canada and those associated with Canadian
agriculture are shown in table 2. Several points in this table are worthy of note. Direct and
indirect emissions from agriculture make up 14 percent of total Canadian GHG emissions;
thus agriculture is nationally important. Nitrous oxide (N2O) and methane (CH4) dominate
direct emissions from agriculture, while CO2, N2O and CH4 are all important for indirect
emissions. Although non-agricultural Canadian emissions are dominated by CO2, agricul-
tural emissions have large components of N2O and CH4.
Table 2 Canadian Total and Agricultural Anthropogenic GHG Emissions in 1991
All sources Direct ag. Indirect ag. Total ag. % ag.
Million tonnes of CO2 equivalent
Carbon dioxide 452 5 15 20 4
Methane 70 20 9 29 41
Nitrous oxide 51 24 10 34 66
Total 575 49 34 83 14
Source: Janzen et al., 1999
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agriculture (Janzen et al., 1999). About one-half of the agricultural N2O emissions are cre-
ated primarily from the nitrogen cycle that occurs within agricultural soils. During the
processes of nitrification and denitrification N2O is released into the atmosphere. The
amount of nitrogen released depends on many factors, including moisture levels, carbon
and nitrogen availability, and temperature. These N2O releases occur both with natural
forms of nitrogen, e.g., manure and legumes; and with manufactured forms of nitrogen,
e.g., nitrogen fertilizer. The release of nitrous oxide tends to be episodic with large quanti-
ties released in very short periods. Other N2O emissions occur during the decomposition of
manure during storage and application, and during the manufacture of fertilizer and other
agricultural inputs. The estimates of emissions of nitrous oxide from Canadian agriculture
are very preliminary and will be the focus of study and measurement for the next several
years.
Methane is another important GHG for agriculture. Methane is released during anaer-
obic decomposition of organic matter. By far the largest source of CH4 emissions within
agriculture is enteric fermentation within the rumen of beef and dairy cattle, accounting for
80 percent of agricultural methane emissions. Most of the remaining 20 percent of methane
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Figure 3 Net annual exchange of CO2 by crops
Source:  Desjardins, 1999emissions comes from the decomposition of all forms of livestock and poultry manure dur-
ing storage and handling.
The large CO2/carbon cycle within agricultural production systems is not apparent in
these net emission figures because the cycle is nearly in balance. Agricultural crops use the
energy in sunlight to combine CO2, water, and other nutrients to produce organic matter.
Each year agricultural crops in Canada use photosynthesis to convert approximately 500
million tonnes of CO2 from the atmosphere into plant material each year—roughly equiv-
alent to the total Canadian net emissions of GHGs (Desjardins, 1999). As figure 3 shows,
most of this material is harvested in crops and returned to the atmosphere as soon as it is
digested by animals or humans. Asignificant portion of the carbon is retained in the soil or
as crop residue for short periods. A small portion of the crop residue becomes part of the
soil organic matter where it can be stored for long periods of time before being returned to
the atmosphere as CO2.
The large amount of carbon/CO2 in the agricultural system creates significant scope for
management that could sequester carbon and reduce atmospheric CO2. There has been a
significant loss of soil carbon since cultivation began in Canada. More recently, soil organ-
ic matter has begun to accumulate in many soils, largely due to the adoption of zero
tillage–continuous cropping systems (Janzen et al., 1999). These increases in the organic
matter in the soil reduce the stock of carbon in the atmosphere. Activities that use crop
material to replace fossil fuels leave the fossil fuels in the ground and thereby contribute to
GHG emission reduction. Overall, management of the carbon cycle provides some of the
greatest scope for reducing GHG emissions from agriculture.
Implications of Including Sinks
The inclusion of agricultural soils and other carbon sinks in the Kyoto Accord is a very
important issue for the sector and for the potential ratification of the accord. Recent analy-
sis indicates that the U.S. Conservation Reserve Program has resulted in a massive seques-
tration of carbon in these soils. Further sequestration can be achieved through restoration
of mine sites and through agro-forestry in the Southeastern United States. This large poten-
tial for agricultural sinks has resulted in the United States joining Canada as a promoter of
the inclusion of sinks in the Kyoto Accord. The Sixth Conference of Parties to the FCCC
(COP 6) will be held in November 2000 to discuss the inclusion of agricultural sinks in the
Kyoto Accord. The United States and the EU held bilateral talks on the same issue prior to
the meeting. The inclusion of agricultural sinks as a form of emission reduction would
greatly increase the probability of U.S. ratification of the Kyoto Accord.3
The trade and production implications of including agricultural sinks in a ratified
accord would be significant for the sector. Inclusion would give agricultural land an alter-
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agroforestry and marginal land–permanent cover programs become economically feasible.
Governments and potentially the private sector would provide significant incentives to
remove land from annual cultivation and place it under permanent vegetative cover to
sequester carbon. There would also be increased emphasis on the use of agricultural crops
to produce biofuels and fibre. These alternative uses have the potential—far more than fur-
ther trade liberalization has—to increase and stabilize the prices of grains and oilseeds.
Industrial uses would divert resources away from food production, particularly during peri-
ods of low prices.
The domestic policies used to reduce agricultural GHG emissions are likely to affect
trade policy in the sector. Given that GHG abatement is likely to require resources, coun-
tries that comply with the accord may demand some form of reciprocity from their trading
partners. This will create pressure to include GHG policies within bilateral and regional
trade agreements.
Conclusions and Implications 
for Future Agricultural Trade Policy
F
urther WTO trade reform in the grain and oilseed sectors will be difficult to achieve.
The somewhat successful UR had budget and internal reform pressures that do not
presently exist to assist the process. There is little pressure now to bring the United States
or the EU to an agreement. This does not imply that efforts toward further agricultural trade
reform should not be pursued, it only suggests that the process should continue to simmer
so that progress can be made when economic forces create the short-lived opportunities
necessary for further progress.
The Kyoto Accord is potentially a very important agreement for agricultural produc-
tion and trade. Ratification of a GHG reduction agreement would divert excess resources
from food production. Much research is still needed to assess the potential implications of
GHG reduction agreements on global agricultural production and trade. There is a need to
understand how GHG reduction agreements and policies can be used to ameliorate some
of the adverse effects of existing domestic support policies for agriculture. There is also a
need to anticipate how GHG reduction agreements will inevitably spill over into trade
agreements and trade policy.
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ment, with their use subject to some restrictions.
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